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Li Thian-hok
On June 18, 2007, President Chen Shui-bian announced that he
would hold an island-wide referendum on applying for UN
membership under the name "Taiwan." US State Department
spokesman Sean McCormack reacted negatively the next day. "We do
not support Taiwan's membership in international organizations
that require statehood. This would include a referendum on
whether to apply to the United Nations under 'Taiwan.'" The
grounds for US objections were amplified by Deputy Secretary of
State John Negroponte on August 27 in an interview with Phoenix
TV: "We oppose . . . that kind of a referendum because we see
that as a step towards a declaration of independence of Taiwan,
towards an alteration of the status quo." On August 30, National
Security Council Senior Director for Asian Affairs Dennis Wilder
added: "We are very supportive of Taiwan on many, many fronts .
. . . However, membership in the United Nations requires
statehood. Taiwan, or the Republic of China, is not at this
point a state in the international community. The position of
the United States government is that the ROC . . . Republic of
China . . . is an issue undecided and it has been left undecided
. . . for many, many years . . . . There has been a large scale
. . . Chinese military buildup opposite Taiwan, and that is
worrisome. And we certainly do not want to see any situation in
which Beijing would consider the use of force of the threat of
force against Taiwan."
Tom Christensen's speech
The US position, however, is most clearly spelled out in a
thoughtful speech delivered by Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State Thomas J. Christensen on September 11 at Annapolis. The
speech is titled "A Strong and Moderate Taiwan" and the remarks
represent the agreed views of the US government.
A strong Taiwan is defined as "one that maintains the military
capacity to withstand coercion for an extended period of time"
until help can arrive. While Christensen is glad that Taiwan's
military budget has at long last begun to increase as a
percentage of GDP, he is concerned that Taiwan has yet to have a
serious debate on the island's overall defense strategy and on
how to develop the capacities to sustain it. He hopes, too, that
Taiwan's political leaders will place national defense above
partisan politics.
A moderate Taiwan is one which avoids unnecessary and
unproductive provocations in cross-Strait relations. Christensen
believes that "as long as Taiwan maintains a credible defensive
capability, the chief threats to its welfare are political
actions by Taipei itself that could trigger Beijing's use of
force." This assertion is debatable. To Beijing the mere
existence of free Taiwan is a provocation, threatening China's
autocratic government with the example of a thriving democracy.
Beijing has also declared that it would resort to nonpeaceful
means to annex Taiwan if the island is too slow in surrendering
its sovereignty. Obviously moderation will not necessarily
ensure Taiwan's security.
Nevertheless, avoidance of provocative behavior makes sense,
especially in view of the US preoccupation with Iraq and
Afghanistan, the frayed state of US-Taiwan relations, and
Taiwan's vulnerability to Chinese coercion. Christensen does not
object to the referendum per se. What worries him is the name
change, which he believes could trigger tension or even
conflict. His objection is blunt. "...Supporters of the
referendum . . . do not take seriously Taiwan's commitments to
the United States . . . , are willing to ignore the security
interests of Taiwan's most steadfast friend, and are ready to
put at some risk the security interests of the Taiwan people for
short term political gain."
Popular support for the Referendum
While the DPP government may have failed to consult Washington
in advance, before it committed itself to the UN referendum, and
is deserving of Washington's wrath, it would be rash to judge
that the referendum is merely an election ploy. The fact is the
Taiwanese people are fed up with China's persistent efforts to
isolate and denigrate Taiwan's status. Opinion polls show that
more than 75% of Taiwan's adult population support the
government's effort to apply for membership in international
organizations – including a drive to join the UN under the name
of "Taiwan." More than 60% believe Taiwan should try to increase
its international presence – even if it increases tension with
China. This pressure from below explains why even the opposition
Kuomintang party is proposing to conduct a referendum on whether
to return to the UN under the ROC or other suitable name.
It is interesting to note that a Zogby poll conducted in early
September shows that 61% of American adults believe the US
government should support Taiwan's petition to gain membership
in the UN.
Meanwhile in Taiwan the number of signatures endorsing the UN
referendum under the Taiwan name has now reached 2.7 million,
way above the legal threshold. The two versions of the UN
referendum will be held in conjunction with the presidential
poll on March 22, 2008. While the Central Election Commission is
still working out the procedure in the voting booth, the
referendum will proceed. Neither the DPP nor the KMT can now
abandon its UN referendum without committing political suicide.
Stephen Young and current situation
So it is somewhat surprising that AIT Director Stephen Young
reiterated US objections to the UN referendum in a press
conference in November 9. Young is a competent diplomat who even
learned some Holo Taiwanese language and an energetic athlete
who can run up the steps of Taipei 101. He complained that the
referendum "poses a threat to cross-Strait stability and appears
inconsistent . . . with the spirit of President Chen's public
commitments." Washington and Taipei are now at an impasse.
Neither side is willing nor able to change its position.
Taiwan will conduct the UN referendum next March. One or both of
the referenda may well pass despite the high threshold (a
majority of all eligible voters) if the turnout rate is high
enough. The outcome is unpredictable because the KMT is playing
a complex game of discouraging voting for both referenda while
pretending to promote its own version. What is important,
however, is not the outcome of the referenda, but how to restore
mutual trust between the US and Taiwan and how to prevent a
similar quarrel from developing between the two long-standing
democratic allies.
What Taiwan Needs to do
Christensen's prescription of a strong and moderate Taiwan is
basically sound. In an increasingly precarious environment,
Taiwan must build up its capacities to survive, and not be
sidetracked by symbolic gestures or empty slogans. Taiwan must
first take its national defense seriously. Beyond increasing the
defense budget, Taiwan must find ways to lift morale and improve
readiness, for example, by establishing a credible civil defense
system and an effective system to mobilize reserve troops. The
nation needs to be educated on the importance of national
defense.
Second, economic development must stress self-reliance, away
from excessive economic integration with China. The major
direction should be toward knowledge-based, high value added
industries and away from short-sighted dependence on China's
cheap labor or land.
Third, Taipei should pay greater attention to the interests of
the US and how such interests affect those of Taiwan. Taipei
must learn to work closely with Washington, since both share the
same democratic values and strategic interests in peace and
stability of East Asia. No effort should be spared to restore
mutual trust.
Finally, the Taiwan government must, without fanfare, build up
the national will to defend Taiwan's democracy and freedom. All
inhabitants of the island share the same destiny. If Taiwan were
to fall into the hands of the Chinese Communist Party, all
citizens will lose the guarantee of life, liberty and property
they now enjoy. All citizens, regardless of their ethnic origin
or time of arrival should be proud of their contributions to the
economic miracle and democratization of Taiwan. It is in the
interest of the opposition parties to evolve into a loyal
opposition, instead of trying to subvert Taiwan's democracy from
within because of a misguided and illusory notion of Chinese
nationalism. In any event, the minority of die-hard Chinese
nationalists has no right to impose their pro-Communist ideology
on the majority of freedom-loving Taiwanese.
What the United States must do
For Washington it is best to resist the temptation to penalize
Taiwan for its errant behavior, for example, by withholding the
sale of F-16 C/Ds. Weakening of Taiwan's defense will simply add
to the US burden. The status quo actually is changing every day
as the People's Liberation Army develops ever greater capacity,
not just to invade Taiwan, but eventually to challenge US
dominance of Asia and beyond.
To deter a conflict, the US must maintain sufficient naval and
air presence in the Western Pacific, as mandated by the Taiwan
Relations Act. In the long run, the US must endeavor to persuade
China to renounce the use of force against Taiwan and to respect
the right of the Taiwanese to determine their own future without
outside pressure, because a more democratic and peace-loving
China, in lieu of a repressive and belligerent China, is in the
common interest of America and Taiwan. Taiwan's security, after
all, is ultimately America's security as well.
11-20-2007
©Jay Tsu-yi Loo |